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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COSTS MATTER: EFFECTIVE AIR QUALITY REGULATION IN A
RISKY WORLD

WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN*

I. INTRODUCTION
I want to present an argument that agencies should consider costs in
making complicated scientific regulatory decisions that is somewhat different
from the standard argument in support of a cost-benefit approach. Although I
think what I am saying should have general application, I will focus
particularly on the establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
by the Environmental Protection Agency.1 In this article, I will argue both that
EPA should consider costs, in the particular sense that I am mentioning, and
that the statute allows this.
Let me begin by saying that in a world of limited resources, some type of
cost consideration is, as we all know, inevitable. Statements that costs should
not be considered in a particular context really mean that the cost-benefit
decision reached by one social entity should not be second-guessed by another.
The question thus becomes which organ of government should consider costs,
and at what point in the regulatory process. I concede there is a substantial
argument that Congress can legitimately decide that certain social goals are
worth any likely cost of achieving them, and that Congress can in consequence
forbid the second-guessing of that judgment in the regulatory process.
However, even if we concede that point, there is still a very strong argument
* Mr. Pedersen is an independent practitioner in Washington D.C. Bill Pedersen represents
clients in litigating, rulemaking, and permit and enforcement proceedings under the Clean Air
Act, including “new source review” and “Title V” rules and permits, hazardous air pollutant
control, state implementation plans, and regulation of fuels and motor vehicles. He received his
B.A. from Harvard University, and his LL.B. from Harvard Law School.
This article was written before the Supreme Court’s decision in Whitman v. American
Trucking Association, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001) and has not been updated to reflect that decision.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 7409; Clean Air Act § 109. The purpose of this section is to have the EPA
Administrator set the national ambient air quality standards for criteria air pollutants and then
have the states decide how to control local pollution sources so as to meet those standards through
state implementation plans. See also id. at § 110. The air quality criteria are supposed to
“accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such
pollution. Id. at § 108(a)(2).
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that when agencies evaluate the meaning of uncertain data to carry out such a
command, costs should be considered. Failure to consider costs in this context
is likely to produce economically inefficient regulations without foundation in
any intelligible principle.
II. DISCUSSION
In making any policy decision, costs must be considered somewhere. In a
world of limited resources, no goal is ever attained to the maximum extent
possible. Even the achievement of such pressing, or imperative, goals as
national defense, prevention of disease, or provision of an adequate level of
education is subject to explicit or implicit cost constraints. Environmental
protection is no different. The question is rather which level of government
should make the fundamental judgment on defining social goals and how much
to invest in pursuing them.
A.

Arguments Why Congress Should Consider the Costs of Achieving Goals
and Agencies Should Not

In confirmation of the point I just made, most of the arguments against
considering cost in making regulatory decisions really boil down to the
argument that Congress has already decided on a proper role for costs, and
meant to exclude any agency second-guessing. That is the way the opponents
of considering costs in setting air quality standards in fact argued their point.
A number of arguments why this approach is proper have been advanced. I
will list them from strongest to weakest (in my personal opinion).
1. The Role of Congress
It can well be argued that the ultimate, or even the secondary, goals of our
society should not be selected through cost-benefit analysis even if cost
judgments are proper in selecting the means. Propositions such as “every child
should master basic academic skills” or “the public health should be protected
against damage from air pollution” can articulate legitimate goals regardless of
the practicality of achieving them. Congress as an elected body is far more
suited than an agency to articulate such generic goals. However, if goals are to
be meaningful, Congress cannot stop simply at articulating them. Since
attaining each Congressional mandated goal requires resources that could be
used to attain some other public or private goal, Congress must also specify at
least in rough-cut form the “budget” of social resources to be invested in
pursuing each such goal if its decision is to be meaningful.
Such a system, in which Congress specifies basic public ends and (to some
extent) the means for achieving them, is more politically responsible than a
regime of universal cost-benefit analysis administered by agencies. It is
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probably more “transparent” as well, and provides greater opportunities for
public involvement.
2. Correcting Agency Inaction
Agencies, it is often said, with considerable justification, have a bias
against action, whether that action is needed to establish some new protection
for the public, or to reform a misguided or obsolete program. Some claim that
unless Congress overcomes that bias with a strong command, nothing will get
done.
In a further, more debatable step, some argue that consideration of costs
itself embodies a bias against action. The costs of an action are far easier to
quantify and appreciate than its benefits. Therefore, laws must be structured to
specifically downplay the role of costs in attaining a goal, or nothing will get
done.
3. Correcting the Political Balance
Certain groups and interests, it is said, are underrepresented in our society.
Precisely because of that underrepresentation, they are entitled to “seize the
moment” and “lock in” a resolution favorable to their agenda.
B.

Arguments Against Setting Goals Without Considering Costs in Any Way
1. The Relationship Between Congressional Goal-Setting and Agency
Cost-Consideration

The argument for generic Congressional specification of goals and
“budgets” for achieving them in a way that cannot be defeated by agency costbenefit analysis has considerable force. But even if we accept it, it does not
show that consideration of costs should be banished from agency selection of
the means for achieving that goal. For example, even if Congress states that air
quality standards should be set without considering the costs of attainment or
the benefits of compliance, that still does not mean that costs should be entirely
banished from the setting of any individual standard. Let me explain this
seeming paradox.
Congress may be able to describe a social goal in generic terms and direct
that it be attained without considering costs. However, given the limits on
congressional time and resources, the description of that goal will almost
inevitably be general, and will often lack operational significance precisely
because of its generality. In such circumstances, agencies will have to evaluate
specific facts relevant to the generic Congressional command and issue
particularized regulations that will become the actual focus of attainment
efforts. So, for example, Congress has specified that the public health must be
protected with an “adequate margin of safety” against damage from all widely
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occurring air pollutants,2 but it falls to EPA to give that language meaning by
setting particular air quality standards, at particular numerical levels, for
particular pollutants.3
The data on which such standards must be based almost never points
clearly to a given degree of harm at a given level of pollution. Instead, it will
depict a blur of probabilities. Often, at any given pollution level, harm can
neither be shown to exist nor shown to be absent, much less quantified
precisely. When data is uncertain in this manner, allowing the agency to rely
on it to set particularized goals without considering costs or other practical
consequences runs a real danger of making the agency decision “opaque” to
outside analysis and review. The abstract question when uncertain evidence of
risk, considered all by itself, is an adequate basis for regulation is too elusive to
be consistently answered. Put another way, reliance on only those aspects of
uncertain studies that argue for stricter regulation, without any consideration of
most of the factors that might induce a reasonable decision-maker to reject
such uncertain evidence, allows the agency to be risk-accepting or risk adverse
at will without any defining principle. In deciding whether to rely on uncertain
data in ordinary life, we all take account of the costs of acting on it. We would
be far more likely to have a medical procedure to correct a given harm
performed, rather than waiting for more tests, if that procedure were cheap and
painless as opposed to costly and painful. By ruling out such a common-sense
approach to weighing uncertain data, a “no consideration of costs” approach
can result in the delegation of even more arbitrary power to the agency than
would result from a full-scale cost-benefit test.
Once a particular goal has been set based on uncertain data, considering
costs later, as a guide to, or restriction on, efforts to attain it provides a very
imperfect fix to the problem just identified. The essence of that problem is that
the agency has arbitrary power to set the goal based on strong or weak data
without regard to consequences. Moderation in efforts to attain the goal is not
responsive to this problem, since moderation might be appropriate to goals
based on weak data but not to goals based on strong data.
Particularized goals that do not consider costs in weighing the data are also
likely to be economically inefficient. The decision to set a standard based on
uncertain data is properly analogized to the purchase of insurance. But if we
are precise about that analogy in the air quality standards context, the public
health concerns identified in the uncertain studies is the risk insured against,
while the costs and disruptions of implementing the standard are the price of
the insurance. In that context, one might well ask how we can “buy the
insurance”—that is, set the standard—without evaluating as best we can both

2. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
3. Id.
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the risk being insured against and the cost of insurance—that is, the cost of the
control efforts that an affirmative decision to regulate would trigger.
2. Other Arguments Against Considering Costs
The other arguments raised against agencies considering costs when they
regulate are, to my mind, far less substantial than the first.
 Agency Bias Against Action
It is true that agencies often have a strong bias against action. But that has
nothing to do with whether they should consider costs or not. “Action forcing”
devices can operate equally well with or without considering costs. Action
forcing devices consist of statutory deadlines for taking particular actions, such
as promulgating regulations, and “hammer” provisions. The Clean Air Act is
full of statutory deadlines. When such a deadline is missed, as it often is, it
becomes enforceable by “citizen suit” under section 304 as a “nondiscretionary
duty.” A “hammer” provision states that if an agency does not act by a
particular date, very undesirable consequences automatically follow. The
prime example is in RCRA, where Congress provided that if treatment
standards were not issued by particular dates, any disposal on land of the
affected wastes would be forbidden.
 Costs Are Easier to Quantify
The notion that costs in the narrow financial sense are easier to quantify
and have greater impact than benefits is certainly incomplete and may often be
approximately the reverse of the truth. Direct compliance costs are sometimes
overestimated. But often the major costs of compliance are “intangible”—
applying for and waiting for a permit, and the loss of staff time and disruption
to production schedules if the permit is delayed.4 Most industries say that for
most regulations, these “process costs” are far more significant than the direct
costs of compliance.
 Risks Should Be Balanced Against Costs
Risks are not balanced against cost, measured as dollars spent for
compliance, as often as you might think. In most regulatory areas practically
no provable health cost from a large industrial activity is acceptable, no matter
what the costs of abating it. Instead, such costs are considered in that context
4. Among its innovations, the 1990 Amendments instituted a national permit program,
which had long been an integral part of the Clean Water Act, but lacking in the Clean Air Act.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661(a)–(f). As of January 1998, state and local permitting authorities received
nearly 14,000 applications for operating permits—representing more than 60% of the estimated
22,000 sources subject to the Title V operating permit program nationwide. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR POLLUTION OPERATING PERMIT PROGRAM UPDATE (EPA/451/K98/002, Feb. 1998).
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almost exclusively as an aid to deciding when to take action based on uncertain
data of the sort described above.
 Environmental Advocates Have No Power
Contrary to any claims of powerlessness, environmental advocates have
been extremely successful in obtaining the passage of legislation that imposes
major compliance costs on industry without any cost benefit test. But
sometimes “costs” do not consist of anonymous balance sheet impacts, but
changes to long-established life-styles and expectations. People are far more
reluctant to give up their freedom to drive when and where they wish, or use
land as they wish, than they are to pay money.
 The Impact of Public Opinion
The practice of setting regulations without considering costs helps create a
regulatory system that cannot deal with these primal elements of public
opinion. The inevitable pressure to consider costs somewhere tends to restrict
regulations that do not consider costs to addressing activities, which can
practicably be regulated without considering costs very much. The result is a
set of rules targeted on some, but not all, “major sources” of environmental
damage.5 We can imagine a rule that requires major factories to abate the risks
they create without regard to costs. No such rule applicable to farmers can be
imagined. Yet farming, not factories, is now the country’s major source of
water pollution.6 The political system, in its fixation on not considering costs,
is on the path to trading away the prospect of rules that could address all
sources of an environmental problem, precisely because they did so in a
manner that was balanced across the board, for rules that have limited
applicability precisely because of their unrealistic stringency.
C. Application to the NAAQS Debate
In the particular air quality standards context, the question whether
Congress intended a full cost-benefit balancing test to establish NAAQS is
something of a straw man. The specific evidence against that is strong. The

5. The Clean Air Act defines “major source” in various ways. It is a source with the
potential to emit more than ten tons a year of hazardous air pollutants or more than twenty-five
tons per year of all hazardous air pollutants taken together, or a source in an “attainment area”
with the potential to emit 250 or 100 tons a year, see CAA §169(1), or sources with smaller but
still substantial emissions potentials in “nonattaiment” areas. See, e.g., CAA §181.
6. Nonpoint source pollution remains the nation’s largest source of water quality problems
today. The latest National Water Quality Inventory indicates agriculture is the leading
contributor to water quality impairments, degrading 60% of the impaired river miles and half of
the impaired lake acreage surveyed by states, territories, and tribes. NONPOINT SOURCE
POLLUTION: THE NATION’S LARGEST WATER QUALITY PROBLEM (citing Water National Quality
Inventory, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/facts/point1.htm.
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real question is whether Congress denied costs (in the larger sense) any role in
setting NAAQS. The second is that the relevant statutory language directs
EPA to set air quality standards that “protect the public health” with an
“adequate margin of safety.”7 Under the rule laid down in the Chevron case,8
EPA may consider costs in setting NAAQS unless the text of the statute makes
“unmistakably clear” that Congress meant to bar cost consideration.9
One might argue whether the reference to “public health” displayed that
intent or not. By contrast, I cannot think of any reasonable argument that the
use of the term “adequate margin of safety” denotes intent to exclude costs. A
standard that incorporates a “margin of safety” is one that goes beyond
addressing provable harms. In common parlance, an “adequate margin” is one
set after weighing all the consequences of a setting a lower standard than the
“hard evidence” justifies, not a standard based on only a partial consideration
of some of the consequences. If a standard set to provide a “margin of safety”
is insurance, then, for the reasons given above, that analogy, too, supports
considering the “cost” of the “insurance.” Moreover, the fact that costs can be
weighed, for limited purposes, during the implementation process does nothing
to show that Congress meant to rule out considering costs in setting the
“margin of safety” because it does nothing to correct the defects that would
arise from not considering them. Those defects concern the establishment of a
standard that does not rest on responsibly evaluated evidence and thus is thinly
justified. Moderation in the means for achieving such a standard does nothing
to correct its basic defects.
Apart from the plain meaning of the statutory language, the legislative
history affirmatively suggests that costs and practical impacts should be
considered in evaluating ambiguous data. Discussing the original “margin of
safety language,” the Senate Report on the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
said that “margins of safety are essential to any health-related environmental
standards if a reasonable degree of protection is to be provided against hazards
which research has not yet identified.”10 I cannot see any way to read the
language directing the establishment of “reasonable” protection against
“unidentified” hazards that would rule out consideration of costs as a matter of
law. On the contrary—if the risk is “unidentified” how other than by
considering costs could the “reasonable” degree of protection be identified?
When Congress amended the Act in 1977, it emphasized the importance of
protecting public health, but made clear that “public health” protection did not
embrace a “no-risk philosophy” because that “ignores all economic and social

7.
8.
9.
10.

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43.
S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 10 (1970).
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consequences and is impractical.”11 But if Congress did not adopt the
“impractical philosophy” of ignoring “all economic and social consequences”
for setting NAAQS, then it must have intended economic and social
consequences to be considered in some manner when NAAQS were
established.
III. CONCLUSION
Let me conclude with an open question. If the evidence above shows that
EPA is not precluded from considering costs in setting NAAQS, at least when
it assesses the regulatory significance of uncertain data, does that mean that
EPA may consider costs in that context, or that it must do so?
In my tentative view, it means that EPA must consider them. That is so
because even if EPA has the legal freedom under Chevron not to consider
these costs, the law also requires the agency in these circumstances to give a
reasonable justification for refusing to consider them. But precisely because
considering costs in evaluating the meaning of uncertain data corresponds so
precisely to how such decisions are ordinarily made in the absence of legal
constraint, it is hard to see what justification EPA could offer for departing
from that course if it could not rely on the trump card of legislative command.

11. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 127 (1977).

